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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, November 23, 1976. 25 x1 The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing 25x1 senior US officials.

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not to engage in oil exploration in contested waters, and the Greeks undertook not to lobby in the US and in Western Europe against Turkey.
After a summer of high tensions, both sides seem content for the time being to limit their jockeying and to seek some narrowing of their differences. The limited agreements reached so far offer considerable scope for differing interpretations, however.
For example, the Turks are already inclined to be- lieve that the Greeks are violating their commitment. The Turks, moreover, may find it difficult not to resume an assertive pol- icy in the Aegean next spring, as the campaign for their October parliamentary election heats up. For their part, the Greeks are unlikely to refrain completely from their traditional efforts to seek external support in their dispute with the more powerful Turks.
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POLAND-USSR: Economic Aid
The Soviet economic aid package to Polandagreed upon during party leader Gierek's visit to Moscow earlier this monthwill give Poland's economy a boost and help improve its balance of payments. The package includes the resumption of grain deliveries, shipments of raw materials above planned levels, increased deliveries of consumer goods, and, according to press reports, a low-interest loan worth \$1.3 billion at the current exchange rate.
The report of the Soviet loan credit is still uncon- 252 firmed If true, the credit probably would be used to finance increased imports of machinery, raw materials, and possibly grain from the USSR. At the least, Poland would not have to divert exports from the West to pay for the additional Soviet deliveries.
The credit may allow Poland to redirect some of its exports from the USSR to other markets. Coal and other products could be sold in the West for hard currency, and a suspension or reduction of meat exports could be used to bolster domestic meat stocks, already at an alarmingly low level.
The resumption of Soviet grain deliveries and in- creased shipments of raw materials will allow Poland to curb further the growth of its hard-currency imports in 1977. The
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Soviets reportedly will deliver at least 1 million tons of barley and an undetermined amount of wheat to Poland next year.	
Details on raw materials deliveries are sketchy. Poland reportedly will receive shipments of oil in 1977 at 1976 prices. The Soviets may also have agreed to increased deliveries of raw materials, such as iron ore, that Poland buys from the West for hard currency.	25x1
Polish consumers will benefit somewhat from increased	25X1
imports of consumer goods in chronic short supplyrefrigerators. color television sets, and small household appliances.	25X1 25X1
	23/11
CHINA: Status of Chiao Kuan-hua	
The political status of Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua seems to be in question. //Rumors are circulating in China and in Chinese missions abroad that he will be removed from his post.// He last appeared in public on November 11; since that time he has missed two important visits at which he would normally have been present.	25X1
The official explanation for Chiao's failure to meet visiting President Bokassa of the Central African Republic was illness. He is reportedly being "investigated," however, because of his wife's alleged ties to Mao's disgraced widow, Chiang Ching.	25X1
	25X1
We have no reason to believe Chiao was linked to the four leftists now under attack—he was, in fact, a protege of the late premier Chou En-lai—nor can we confirm allegations that Chiao's wife had ties to Chiang Ching. Chiao's political difficulties, if indeed they exist, would, however, seem to be related to domestic issues rather than to any unhappiness over his conduct of foreign policy or his foreign policy positions.	25%1
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	25X1

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By most accounts, Chiao has gotten along well with new party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. He played no role in Hua's move against the leftistshe was at UN headquarters at the timebut he seemed genuinely pleased by Hua's promotion and	25X1
the arrest of the leftists.	25X1
PERU: Bolivian Corridor Proposal	
Peru has presented Chile with a formal counterproposal for creation of a corridor giving Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean. Chile made its own proposal last December.	25X1
Eventual cession to Bolivia of sovereignty over a corridor through northern Chile to a point short of the ocean.	
Tripartite administration by Peru, Chile, and Bolivia of the remaining section of the corridor to the sea.	
Tripartite administration of the Chilean port of Arica.	
Authorization for Bolivia to construct its own port and to control the corridor's coastline.	
The original Chilean proposal was to grant Bolivia exclusive sovereignty over a similar corridor, with no additional provisions.	25X1
With their current proposal, the Peruvians apparently are counting on Chile and Bolivia to disagree. Peru has long hoped to regain territory in the Arica region which was lost to Chile in the last century, and consequently welcomes any delay on the corridor issue.	25X1
The Bolivian government will study the Peruvian proposal, but for the present is likely to await Chilean reaction. Bolivian leaders probably will be displeased that their country's sovereignty in the proposed corridor would not continue to the sea.	25X1
Chile seems likely to take strong exception to Peru's counterproposal. The Pinochet administration may well continue negotiations to keep relations with Peru amicable, but will	25X1
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	25X1

nevertheless have reservations, particularly about the proposed joint administration of the port of Arica. Indeed, the semi-official press in Santiago has already billed Peru's offer as "a negative response" to Chile's earlier bid.	
There is a good chance that negotiations will eventually founder or reach a stalemate. Chile may not be entirely reluctant to see the corridor idea languish or fail altogether, since realistic hopes in Santiago for a workable solution have probably never been very high.	25X1
Both sides may prefer, nevertheless, to keep the talks going as long as possible. Should a breakdown occur, border tensions would probably increase.	25X1 25X1
JAMAICA: Election Outlook	
Jamaican Prime Minister Manley has called for an early general election, on December 15, in an apparent effort to act before a further erosion of his popularity, as Jamaica's economy continues its decline.	25X1
Manley's People's National Party and the opposition Jamaica Labor Party led by Edward Seaga appear to be running nearly even. A newspaper poll in late October indicated that the ruling party was leading in the popular vote by 51 to 49 percent, but that the Labor Party was likely to achieve a 28-25 advantage in parliamentary seats under the present district arrangement. The House of Representatives, however, is expected to approve today a government proposal to redraw parliamentary district boundaries and create seven new seats.	25X1
Manley is relying heavily on this gerrymandering move. He is also counting on his skill as a campaigner to reverse middle-class voter defection from his party and prevent abstentions by party members who are dissatisfied with his handling of the economy and alarmed at the growing influence of the party's left wing.	25%1
The closeness of the race reflects the marked decline in the Manley government's popularity. In the last national election, in 1972, his party won 56 percent of the popular vote, and it currently holds more than twice the number of seats in the parliament held by the opposition.	25X1
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	25X1

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jobs some months ago. 25X1 Although the new pay boost will provide short-term help for the junta's problems with labor, it will hurt in another respect. The granting of a wage increase will be seen as a concession and eventually will invite challenges from labor and others who see the junta's position as weakening.

strikes and slowdowns; port workers have engaged in a slowdown in recent weeks; and thousands of auto workers walked off their

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